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ABSTRACT
Panama’s former dictator, Manuel Noriega, recently sued
Activision Blizzard in the California Superior Court for using his
likeness and image in the popular video game “Call of Duty:
Black Ops II.” In his complaint, Noriega alleged that the use of
his likeness violated his right of publicity. Former New York
Mayor, Rudy Giuliani, came to Activision’s defense, and filed a
motion to dismiss, which was granted. In granting Activision’s
motion, the court held that Activision’s use of Noriega’s likeness
was transformative and did not violate his right of publicity.
This Issue Brief argues that the California Superior Court
should not have applied the transformative use test but should
have held that Manuel Noriega did not have a right of publicity
for his place in Panama’s history.

INTRODUCTION
Call of Duty is Activision’s most popular videogame franchise.1
It involves a series of “first person shooter” video games where players
take control of a foot soldier in a simulated warfare experience.2 The
first installments of the Call of Duty franchise took place during World
War II and featured actual historical events.3 Some of the later
installments contained fictional storylines and events, such as World War
III.4 The Call of Duty: Black Ops storyline stretches over a long period of
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Declaration of Daniel Suarez in Support of Defendant’s Special Motion to
Strike Plaintiff’s Complaint Under the California Anti-SLAPP Statute at 2, CIV.
PROC. CODE §§ 425.16–425.17, Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard, Inc., No.
BC551747 (Cal. Sup. Ct. L.A. County Oct. 16, 2014) [hereinafter “Suarez
Declaration”].
2
Id.
3
Id. at 5.
4
Id. at 6.
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time, starting in the Cold War and finishing in the future.5 The storyline
also features several real-world historical figures and events.6
Manuel Noriega is depicted as himself in Call of Duty: Black
Ops II.7 He is a non-player character (NPC), and appears in two missions
during the 1980’s portion of the Black Ops II story line.8 He first appears
in a cinematic, and then as the primary objective of a mission.9 There are
similarities between the Manuel Noriega character in Black Ops II and
the real-life Manuel Noriega.10 In fact, Activision created the Noriega
character in Black Ops II by relying on “videos and stills from news
coverage.”11 Anyone looking at a side-by-side comparison of the Manuel
Noriega Black Ops II depiction and the real-life Manuel Noriega will see
that the Black Ops II depiction has the same eye and hair color as the
real-life Noriega, and a nearly identical facial structure and hairstyle.12
Activision hired an actor to “provide voiceover and motion capture13 . . .
for the Noriega character.”14
In 2014, Manuel Noriega sued Activision Blizzard for violating
his right of publicity, by claiming that Activision had misappropriated
his likeness and been unjustly enriched by using his likeness in order to
increase sales of Black Ops II.15 Activision subsequently moved to
dismiss Noriega’s claim under the California Anti-SLAPP (Strategic
Lawsuits Against Public Participation) statute. Under this statute, causes
of action that arise from the exercise of free speech under the United
States Constitution or Constitution of California are “subject to a special
5

Id. at 7, 12.
Id. at 7. Fidel Castro, John F. Kennedy, Robert McNamara and Manuel
Noriega are just some of the historical figures featured in the Call of Duty: Black
Ops series. Id. at 4, 7.
7
Id. at 15.
8
Id. at 4, 11, 16–17.
9
Id. at 16.
10
Id. at 18.
11
Id.
12
See id. The photos on page 18 show a side-by-side comparison of the Black
Ops II Noriega and the real-life Noriega.
13
Motion capture is the process by which “the complex motion of [a
performer’s] body (and face)” is transmitted “to an animated character.” Steve
Dent, What You Need to Know About Motion Capture, ENGAGDET (July 14th,
2014, 11:00 AM), http://www.engadget.com/2014/07/14/motion-captureexplainer/.
14
Suarez Declaration, supra note 1, at 18.
15
Complaint at 2, Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard, Inc., No. BC 551747 (Cal.
Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, July 15, 2014)) [hereinafter “Noriega
Complaint”].
6
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motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has
established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the
claim.”16 The Court granted Activision’s anti-SLAPP motion and
concluded that Activision was protected under the First Amendment.17
Part I of this Issue Brief will discuss the district court’s decision,
the legal framework underlying a theory of publicity claim, and the
transformative use defense. Part II will analyze the district court’s
decision and argue that the district court should have held that Manuel
Noriega did not have a right of publicity for his place in Panama’s
history, instead of applying the transformative use test.

I. BACKGROUND
A. The California Anti-SLAPP Statute
The Anti-SLAPP statute is designed to reduce the number of
lawsuits “brought primarily to chill valid exercise of the constitutional
right[] of freedom of speech.”18 Courts use a two step-process in
determining whether an Anti-SLAPP motion should be granted.19 First,
“the defendant must make a threshold showing that the challenged cause
of action arises from protected activity.”20 Once this showing is made the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that there is a probability that he
will prevail on the merits of the claim.21 To determine whether the
plaintiff has adequately demonstrated a probability of prevailing, the trial
“court does not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations,”
and must consider any Constitutional defense, such as a First
Amendment freedom of speech defense.22 The court assumes that the
plaintiff’s allegations are true and must grant the motion if the plaintiff
fails to show a probability of prevailing, or if there is a valid
Constitutional defense.23

16

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West 2014).
Order Dismissing Defendant’s Special Motion to Strike at 4, Noriega v.
Activision/Blizzard, Inc., No. BC 551747 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County,
Oct. 27, 2014), 2014 WL 5930149, at *4.
18
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §425.16(a)).
19
No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 403 (Ct. App.
2011).
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 404 (quoting Ross v. Kish, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 484, 491 (Ct. App. 2006)).
23
See id.
17
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B. The Common Law Right of Publicity
Under the common law right of publicity, a public figure may
bring an “invasion of privacy tort” when his likeness is commercially
exploited.24 In order to prevail on a right of publicity claim, the plaintiff
must show that his likeness has been appropriated and commercially
exploited to the defendant’s advantage.25 The California Civil Code
contains a provision for bringing claims similar to the common law right
of publicity, but has one additional element.26 Under California law, the
defendant must know that he is appropriating the public figure’s
likeness.27 “The misappropriation of likeness refers to a person’s visual
image.”28
The right of publicity was created in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co.,29 where the Supreme Court held that the First
Amendment does not protect infringements on the right of publicity.30 In
Zacchini, the plaintiff performed a “human cannonball” act, where he
was shot out of a cannon, flew in the air for two hundred feet, and landed
in a net.31 He performed at fairs, where members of the public, who had
paid to enter, were not charged an additional fee to watch his act.32 A
free-lance reporter, employed by the defendant broadcasting company,
attended the fair and taped the entire act, despite the plaintiff’s request
that the act not be taped.33 The act was then broadcasted on the 11
o’clock news.34 After his act was broadcasted, the “human cannonball”
sued the defendant broadcasting company claiming, among other things,
that the defendant had “unlawf[ully] appropriate[ed] [his] professional
property.”35 The defendant broadcasting company responded by arguing
that broadcasting the plaintiff’s act was protected under the First
Amendment.36

24

Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 612 (Ct. App. 2006).
Id.
26
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 2014).
27
Id.
28
Kirby, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 613 (citing Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460,
463 (9th Cir. 1988)).
29
433 U.S. 562 (1977).
30
Id. at 578–79.
31
Id. at 563.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 563–64.
34
Id. at 564.
35
Id.
36
Id.
25
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In deciding whether the defendant was protected under the First
Amendment, the Court considered the state’s interest in prohibiting the
appropriation of a celebrity’s likeness without his consent. The Court
ultimately held that the state had an interest “in protecting the propriety
interest of the individual in his act in part to encourage such
entertainment.”37
The Court compared the broadcasting of the human cannonball’s
act to copyright infringement, and was concerned that the broadcasting
company had posed a “substantial threat to the economic value of [the
performance]” by showing the “human cannonball’s” act on the news.38
The Court noted that, as in copyright, protecting a performer’s act would
“provide[] an economic incentive for [the creator of the performance] to
make the investment required to produce a performance of interest.”39
In a subsequent case, Comedy III Productions v. Gary Saderup
Inc.,40 the California Supreme Court further discussed the right of
publicity, after an artist, who sold t-shirts bearing literal depictions of the
“Three Stooges,” was sued by the production company of the infamous
trio.41 The company claimed that its right to publicity had been violated
when the “Three Stooges” depiction was appropriated to the t-shirts.42
The court ruled in favor of the production company, holding that
the “Three Stooges” had a right of publicity to depictions of their
likeness.43 In coming to this conclusion the court found that the right of
publicity protected a form of intellectual property that was the result of
considerable labor.44 The following quotation captures the court’s
reasoning:
Often considerable money, time and energy are needed to develop
one’s prominence in a particular field. Years of labor may be
required before one’s skill, reputation, notoriety or virtues are
sufficiently developed to permit an economic return through some
medium of commercial promotion. For some, the investment may
eventually create considerable commercial value in one’s identity.45
37

Id. at 573.
Id. at 575–76.
39
Id. at 576.
40
25 Cal. 4th 387 (2001).
41
Id. at 393.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 409–10.
44
Id. at 399.
45
Id. at 399 (citations omitted) (quoting Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d
813, 834–35 (1979)).
38
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The court found that the “Three Stooges” had gone through a
“long and arduous” journey to become famous and depictions of them
“amounting to little more than the appropriation of [their] economic
value [were] not protected under the First Amendment.”46 As a result of
this reasoning, the court found that the literal depictions of the “Three
Stooges” violated Comedy III’s right of publicity.47
Similarly, in Estate of Presley v. Russen, a distinction was drawn
between the use of a character’s likeness for historical purposes and the
exploitation of a character’s likeness for commercial purposes.48 In
Estate of Presley, a production company that featured Elvis
impersonators was sued by Elvis Presley’s heirs, under the theory that
the impersonators were commercially exploiting Elvis’ fame.49 In
holding for Presley’s heirs, the court concluded that portrayals of Elvis
that served “the purpose of contributing information . . . to the public
debate of political or social issues” would be immune from liability.50
Portrayals of Elvis that “function[] primarily as a means of commercial
exploitation,” however, would not be immune from liability.51 The court
then applied a balancing test, which weighed the societal interests of free
expression against Elvis’ heirs’ right to exploit his publicity. The court
concluded that the Elvis imitation provided limited social value because
it did not contain “its own creative component.”52 However, the court did
note that biographical films or plays depicting Elvis’ role in the history
and development of Rock n’ Roll would not infringe on the heirs’ rights
to exploit Elvis’ publicity.53
Then, in Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc.54 the Ninth Circuit delineated
the interests that the right of publicity protects.55 Keller revolved around
a right of publicity claim brought by National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA) football players, against Electronic Arts (EA).56
The players alleged that EA had misappropriated their likeness in EA’s
NCAA Football video game series.57 EA argued that they were protected
46

Id. at 400.
Id. at 409–10.
48
513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981).
49
See id. at 1344.
50
Id. at 1356.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 1359.
53
Id. at 1360.
54
724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013).
55
Id. at 1281.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 1269.
47
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under the First Amendment because the NCAA Football games did not
mislead consumers into believing that the players had endorsed EA or its
products.58 In rejecting this argument, the court noted that “[t]he right of
publicity protects the celebrity, not the consumer,” and that the players
were entitled to compensation for appropriations of their likeness, when
their celebrity status was earned through “talent and years of hard work
on the football field.”59

C. The Transformative Use Defense
Transformative use is an affirmative defense to a right of
publicity claim.60 Under the transformative use defense, a defendant
cannot be found liable for violating another’s right of publicity if “the
product containing the celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it has
become . . . the defendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity’s
likeness.”61 For instance, in Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc.,62 the
California Supreme Court considered whether Kieran Kirby, the lead
singer of a musical group, had a right of publicity claim against Sega,
when Sega modeled a video game character, “Ulala,” after her.63 The
court ultimately held that Sega’s use of Kirby’s likeness was protected
under the transformative use test, because Sega’s depiction of Ulala was
not a literal depiction of Kirby but rather a “transformative work.”64
While the court noted several similarities between Ulala and Kirby, such
as similarly shaped eyes; pink hair; and brightly colored shoes, the court
found that Ulala was Sega’s own creative work.65 In coming to this
conclusion the court noted that Ulala was not a literal depiction of Kirby,
as she had a different physique, and that Ulala was a space age reporter,
which was “unlike any public depiction of Kirby.”66

58

Id. at 1281.
Id.
60
See Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808
(Cal. 2001) (“[W]orks of parody or other distortions . . . do not generally
threaten markets for celebrity memorabilia that the right of publicity is designed
to protect.”).
61
Id. at 809.
62
144 Cal. App. 4th 47 (Ct. App. 2006).
63
Id. at 51–52.
64
Id. at 61.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 59. The Court also noted that there were significant differences in the
dance moves that Ulala and Kirby performed; Ulala’s dance moves were short,
with quick movements, which were unlike the movements Kirby had in her
dance videos. Id.
59
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Contrast the result in Kirby to the case mentioned earlier,
Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup Inc,67 where the court
concluded that t-shirts containing literal drawings of the Three Stooges
were not protected under the transformative use test because the
depictions were “subordinated to the overall goal of creating a
conventional portrait of [the “Three Stooges” in order to] commercially
exploit [their] fame.”68

D. Historical Figures’ Right of Publicity for Their Place in History
In Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions69 the California
Supreme Court held that the right of publicity “cannot be inherited by
descendents.”70 However, in a concurring opinion, Justice Bird provided
insight into the First Amendment’s protection of the appropriation of
public and historical figures:
Contemporary events, symbols and people are regularly used in
fictional works. Fictional writers may be able to more persuasively,
or more accurately, express themselves by weaving into the tale
persons or events familiar to their readers. The choice is theirs. No
author should be forced into creating mythological worlds or
characters wholly divorced from reality. The right to publicity
derived from public prominence does not confer a shield to ward off
caricatures, parody and satire. Rather, prominence invites creative
comment. Surely, the range of free expression would be
meaningfully reduced if prominent persons in the present and recent
past were forbidden topics of imaginations of authors and fictions.71

Justice Bird used this insight to conclude that historical figures do not
have a right to publicity when their likeness is used in fictional works.72

67

21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
Id. at 810. The court contrasted the depiction of the “Three Stooges” with
Andy Warhol’s depictions of celebrities. The court noted that Warhol’s
depiction would receive protection under the transformative use test because,
because Warhol’s depictions went “beyond the commercial exploitation of
celebrity images and became a form of ironic social comment on the
dehumanization of [the] celebrity itself. Id. at 811. Andy Warhol’s portraits can
be seen at Celebrity Portraits, THE ANDY WARHOL EXPERIENCE,
http://puffin.creighton.edu/museums/archive/7_abarnett/page2.htm (last visited
July 22, 2015).
69
603 P.2d 454 (Cal. 1979).
70
Id. at 455.
71
Id. at 460 (Bird, J., concurring).
72
Id.
68
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If it were otherwise “the creation of historical novels and other works
inspired by actual events and people would be off limits to [authors].”73

E. The District Court’s Decision
The district court granted Activision’s anti-SLAPP motion,
concluding that Activision’s depiction of Noriega constituted
Activision’s own artistic expression, therefore it was protected under the
transformative use test.74 In its decision, the district court found it
significant that Noriega was only featured in two of the game’s eleven
missions and was “just one of more than 45 characters, including other
historical figures, who appear in the game.”75 The court also found it
significant that players could not “assume the Noriega character’s
identity, control its movements, or experience game play through its
eyes.”76

II. ANALYSIS
While the district court was correct in granting the anti-SLAPP
motion, it did so for the wrong reason. The district court grounded its
decision based on the transformative use test, which is an affirmative
defense to a right of publicity claim.77 However, Noriega does not have a
right of publicity to depictions of his place in history to begin with. The
court should have granted the anti-SLAPP motion on the grounds that
Noriega did not have a right of publicity on which to make a claim.

A. Manuel Noriega Does Not Have a Right to Publicity for His
Place in Panama’s History
Manuel Noriega does not have a right to publicity for his
exploits as Panama’s dictator. Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball78
supports this position. In Gionfriddo, four professional baseball players
sued the Major League Baseball Clubs (MLB) for including their
statistics and names in “assorted All-Star game and World Series
programs,”79 and for including videos and photographs of them in the
“histories of major league baseball productions.”80 The court dismissed
73

Id. at 462.
Order Dismissing Defendant’s Special Motion to Strike at 4, Noriega v.
Activision/Blizzard, Inc., No. BC 551747 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County,
Oct. 27, 2014), 2014 WL 5930149, at *4.
75
Id. at 3.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 4.
78
114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
79
Id. at 311.
80
Id.
74
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the players’ claims and held that Major League Baseball could use
photos, statistics and videos of these major league baseball players to
“present[] historic events from long ago.”81 The court considered these to
be “fragments from baseball’s mosaic,” or, in other words, pieces of
baseball’s history protected under the First Amendment.82
In a similar case, Mickey Dora, whose “exploits in Malibu . . .
are the folklore of [surfing],” sued Frontline video for creating a “video
documentary entitled ‘The Legends of Malibu.’”83 Dora alleged that
Frontline had used, without authorization, his name, voice, and likeness
in the documentary.84 In dismissing Dora’s complaint, the court held that
the documentary was a matter of public interest afforded First
Amendment protection because it had social value in documenting “a
certain time and place in California history and, indeed, in American
Legend.”85
Estate of Presley v. Russen,86 also supports the conclusion that
Manuel Noriega does not have a right of publicity for his place in
Panama’s history. In Estate of Presley, the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey held that heirs of Elvis Presley had a right
of publicity claim to shows that included Elvis impersonators.87
However, the court differentiated between a biographical film or play of
Elvis and an Elvis impersonator performing on a live stage.88 The court
found that the biographical films and plays are immune from right of
publicity claims because the public has an interest in “tracing the role of
Elvis Presley in the development of rock “n roll.”89
Moreover, the policy reasons for giving celebrities right of
publicity claims, do not apply to historical figures.90 Right of publicity
claims protect a “form of intellectual property that society deems to have

81

Id. at 314.
Id.
83
Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 791 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
84
Id.
85
Id. at 792.
86
513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981).
87
Id. at 1361.
88
Id. at 1360.
89
Id.
90
See, e.g., Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797,
808 (Cal. 2001) (stating that right of publicity claims protect a form of
intellectual property); Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268, 1281 (9th Cir.
2013) (explaining that professional football had right to publicity for years of
hard work and talent needed to become a college athlete).
82
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some social utility.”91 For example, the “human cannonball” had the
right of publicity for his act, which was popular among crowds at the
fair, and the Three Stooges had a right of publicity for appropriations of
their likeness due to their notoriety as a comedy trio.92 Both the Three
Stooges and the “human cannonball” had a right of publicity that derived
from unique acts and years of labor. Appropriations of their likeness
would allow third parties to benefit from their celebrity status, which in
turn would reduce the economic value of the infamy that they earned
through hard work and ingenuity.93 Similarly, athletes have a right to
publicity due to their great talent, which is generally the result of years of
hard work and dedication to a particular sport.94 Third parties who
appropriate the likeness of athletes gain economic value from the
athletes’ hard work and talent, without having to invest the time and
energy needed to become skilled in a particular sport.
The policy implications under the right of publicity claims do not
apply to Manuel Noriega. He is not famous for being an actor,
professional athlete, or entertainer. His infamy is not based in any talent
or unique act, but rather in his place in Panama’s history. In 1983,
Manuel Noriega took control of the Panamanian army and engaged in
“election fraud, drug trafficking, money laundering, and espionage
against the United States.”95 Then in 1987 he declared a national
emergency after a political opponent accused him of fixing the 1984
elections and ordering the killing of a prominent figure that had accused
him of drug trafficking.96 As part of his declaration of a national
emergency, he “suspended constitutional rights, closed newspapers and
radio stations, and drove his political enemies into exile.”97 In 1989 he
declared an election void after the candidate he backed failed to win and
instead installed a president of his choosing.98 In 1990 he was captured

91

Comedy III Productions, 21 P.3d at 804.
See supra notes 31–47 and accompanying text.
93
See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575 (1977)
(stating that broadcasting defendant’s act would cause significant economic
damage to the value of his performance).
94
See Keller, 724 F.3d at 1281 (stating that football player had to right to
publicity for years of hard work and talent on football field).
95
Manuel Noriega, THE ROBINSON LIBRARY (Feb. 18, 2015),
http://www.robinsonlibrary.com/america/central/panama/noriega.htm.
96
Manuel Noriega Biography, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD BIOGRAPHY,
NOTABLEBIOGRAPHIES.COM (last visited July 22, 2015).
97
Id.
98
Id.
92
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after fleeing an armed conflict with the United States and surrendering to
the Vatican Embassy in Panama City.99
Manuel Noriega is but a historical figure, whose infamy stems
from these criminal acts.100 If Manuel Noriega had a right of publicity for
his place in history, numerous other historical figures would have a right
of publicity for scandalous or criminal conduct. Bill Clinton would have
a right of publicity for depictions of his affair with Monica Lewinsky and
James Holmes101 would have a right of publicity for depictions of the
shooting that took place in an Aurora movie theater. This would be an
untenable result as there is no societal interest in allowing historical
figures who gained infamy from their place in history, to reap economic
value that stems from their depictions. To the contrary, allowing
historical figures to bring right of publicity claims for depictions of their
place in history would preclude the media from depicting historical
events, which would deprive the public access to historical reenactments.
Black Ops II includes depictions of Manuel Noriega in order to
lend “authenticity” to its historical narrative.102 And, as Activision
pointed out in its motion to dismiss, numerous historical works would be
chilled if Noriega were to successfully use the “right to publicity to
censor fictional accounts of [his] place in history.”103 Among these works
are Ragtime,104 which features Harry Houdini, J.P. Morgan, Henry Ford,
and Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and Midnight in Paris,105 featuring
Ernest Hemingway and F. Scott Fitzgerald.106
Furthermore, the depiction of Noriega in Black Ops II is not like
the depiction of the “human cannonball” in Zacchini.107 In Zacchini the
plaintiff had created an act, the “human cannonball.” The Court found
99

Id.
See supra notes 95–99 and accompanying text.
101
James Holmes killed 12 people and wounded 58 people in 2012. Erica
Goode, Serge F. Kovaleski, Jack Healy & Dan Frosch, Before Gunfire, Hints of
‘Bad News’, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2012, at A1.
102
Suarez Declaration, supra note 1, at 15.
103
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Special
Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Complaint under the California Anti-SLAPP Statute,
CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 425.16–425.16, Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard, Inc., No.
BC 551747, at 7–9 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Los Angeles County, July 15, 2014)
[hereinafter “Anti-SLAPP motion”].
104
E.L. DOCTOROW, RAGTIME (1975).
105
MIDNIGHT IN PARIS (Gravier Productions 2011).
106
Anti-SLAPP motion, supra note 103, at 8–9.
107
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
100
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that the defendant’s decision to film the “human cannonball” act went to
the “heart of [the plaintiff’s] ability to earn a living as an entertainer.”108
There is no such issue here. Manuel Noriega was a dictator of Panama,
he was not an actor or athlete. The historical fact that he was a dictator is
not commercially exploitable. Unlike the “human cannonball,” Noriega
has not created anything. And unlike athletes, Noriega’s infamy did not
arise from years of hard work and talent. Noriega’s place in Panama’s
history does not belong to him any more than historical accounts and
depictions belong to other historical figures. For instance, Richard Nixon
does not own depictions of the Watergate scandal and George Bush does
not own depictions of his presidency during the war with Iraq. To the
contrary, just like the biographies and historical depictions of Elvis,
depictions of Noriega belong to the public, which has an interest in his
place in history.109

B. The District Court Should Not Have Applied the Transformative
Use Test in Dismissing Noriega’s Claim
The transformative use test is an affirmative defense to a right of
publicity claim.110 Thus, the court implicitly recognized that Noriega had
a right of publicity claim by holding that Blizzard’s use of Noriega’s
likeness was “transformative” and thereby protected under the First
Amendment. This is concerning because it opens the door for right of
publicity claims by historical figures, as long as their depictions are not
transformative. For instance, imagine a similar case where Noriega sues
a movie company for producing a film that realistically depicts the
events of his life. It is unlikely that such a movie would be protected by
the transformative use test if it attempted to depict Noriega’s life as
realistically as possible, and the economic value of the movie arose from
Noriega’s fame.111 Similarly, Bill Clinton would have a right of publicity
claim for depictions of his affair with Monica Lewinsky and George
Bush would have right of publicity claims for depictions of him in his
presidency. This would be an untenable result and contrary to the
purpose behind right of publicity claims. Unfortunately, by applying the
transformative use test, the district court’s holding has opened the door
for historical figures to bring these right of publicity claims in the future.
This sets a dangerous precedent. The district court could have avoided an
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implicit recognition that these right of publicity claims are valid if it had
dismissed Noriega’s claim on the ground that he did not have a right of
publicity for his place in Panama’s history in the first place.

CONCLUSION
The Superior Court of California correctly dismissed Noriega’s
claim against Activision. However, it should have held that Noriega did
not have a right of publicity for his place in history, rather than applying
the transformative use test. The right of publicity only applies when the
commercial exploitation of an individual’s likeness arises from his
artistic labor. Noriega is not famous because he is an athlete, magician,
singer, or any other type of artist. His infamy comes from his place in
history as Panama’s former dictator.
By applying the transformative use test, the district court
implicitly asserted that Noriega has a right of publicity for his place in
history, which could have a chilling effect on the production of movies
and other works of art featuring historical events. Moreover, the theory
of publicity is based on the idea that an artist should have rights to profits
from the appropriation of his likeness when his likeness has become
economically valuable due to the fruits of his labor. There is no social
value in allowing historical figures to bring right of publicity claims
when they are depicted in their place in history. To the contrary, this
would be detrimental to the public’s access to depictions of historically
important events.

